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ARGUMENT 
I. THE PRECLUSION OF THE LIPPMAN'S EXPERT 
WITNESSES IS A SANCTION AND IS TANTAMOUNT TO 
A DISMISSAL AND DESERVES MORE CAREFUL 
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT. 
Coldwell Banker is right in stating that the trial court has been given 
great latitude in determining the most efficient and fair manner to conduct 
the court's business. Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., P.3d 1, 7 
(Utah App. 2007). Rule 37(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states 
that: 
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document, or other material 
... that party shall not be permitted to use the witness, 
document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to 
disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the 
failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the 
court on motion may take any action authorized by Subdivision 
(b)(2). 
URCP 37(f) (2209) (Emphasis added). 
Unfortunately, the trial court and Coldwell Banker have rigidly 
adopted the efficiency of the case management and the exclusion of 
witnesses with fervor, while overlooking the fairness and exceptions 
to the rule. Both have chosen to gloss over the facts constituting 
exigency and good cause, and in the case of Coldwell Banker, 
Coldwell Banker has chosen to call the exigent circumstances "tales 
of woe" and "tall tales" without addressing whether or not such 
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circumstances are in fact good cause and exigent circumstances 
requiring the trial court to exercise discretion. A more reasoned 
approach would suggest that the burden of showing it is harmless or 
there is good cause must still be analyzed, but that the results of any 
sanction must be considered. Due process cannot be skirted by the 
label we apply to a sanction. Otherwise, we exalt form over substance. 
A. UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 37(f) DOES NOT 
REQUIRE THE EXCLUSION OF LIPPMAN'S EXPERT 
REPORTS AND IT IS A SANCTION. 
Coldwell Banker relies heavily on Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, 
Inc., 2009 UT App 347. Ironically, Coldwell Banker was a party to this 
action as well. Coldwell Banker insists that the facts between the cases are 
"nearly identical." While the similarities are quite striking, it is the 
differences that are remarkable and compelling. 
In Posner, Posner failed to disclose an expert witness in a timely 
manner. On appeal Posner argued that there was a tacit agreement between 
the parties to push the deadline for disclosure out past mediation. Id at ]f 25. 
In that case, the trial court found that "no agreement to ignore the discovery 
deadline existed, and Posner had not otherwise shown good cause for his 
untimely filing." Id. 
Unlike Posner, where the trial court considered the proffer that an 
agreement was made and made a factual determination that no agreement 
existed, this trial seemingly ignores Lippman's justification. 
The trial court in denying the motion stated, "[c]laims stated premised 
on the need for expert testimony should be filed based on the expert 
consultation not the other way around." (R. 2442) Yet, in the motions for 
more time to disclose experts witnesses Lippman clearly pointed out the 
Court that they need time because one expert witness they had lined up, 
Brandon Wood, had backed out at the last minute. (R. 1886, 2382) Such a 
statement by the court, in light of specific facts by Lippman in his motion, 
puts in grave doubt as to whether the trial court even read the memorandum. 
Such egregious oversights by the trial court and its failure to provide 
any factual analysis for not believing or otherwise ignoring Lippman's 
justification show no exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court. 
In Posner, the trial court gave a reasoned factual basis for rejecting 
Posner's argument for good cause. In the present case, the court gave no 
factual or reasoned analysis for rejecting Lippman's good cause, but rather 
gave oddly strange justification that were incongruous with the facts 
presented to the trial court by motion, suggesting the perhaps the court did 
not even read the memoranda. Such oversights are unacceptable. Rule 37(f) 
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requires preclusion "unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party 
shows good cause for the failure to disclose." So, while Rule 37(f) does 
require preclusion, it very clearly gives exceptions that the trial court either 
glossed over or ignored. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OF THE EXPERT 
WITNESSES WAS TANTAMOUNT TO DISMISSAL. 
Coldwell Banker, once again, cites to Posner, to suggest that a 
discovery sanction is not tantamount to a dismissal and that trial court's 
action in Posner was an exclusionary sanction and not a dismissal. Rather it 
was the lack of a witness that led to the dismissal. Id at f 23, f 8. 
Conversely, in that same footnote, this Court stated: 
Posner briefly alludes to a violation of his due process rights, 
claiming that the trial court dismissed his case as a sanction and 
thereby denied him his right to a jury trial. However, Posner 
inadequately briefs this challenge* 
Id. 
Two important points need to be made before briefly revisiting 
the Kilpatrick case. Lippman is not suggesting that this is a dismissal, 
but rather the results are tantamount to a dismissal and therefore, due 
process under a dismissal analysis must be carefully considered as 
analogous. Finally, Lippman has adequately briefed a due process 
claim and wishes to briefly revisit this claim again. 
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In Kilpatrick v. Bollough Abatement, Inc., 199 P.3d 957 (Utah 
2008), the widow the decedent had her husband cremated after the 
trial court ordered that an autopsy be done upon his death. Ms. 
Kilpatrick out of grief and lapse in judgment cremated her husband 
without an autopsy. Id at 966. The trial court dismissed. 
The Supreme Court of this state cited the United States 
Supreme Court in holding that there was a constitutional limit on the 
dismissal of a case and a trial court cannot dismiss a case when failure 
to comply was "due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or 
any fault of the petitioner." Id citing Societe Internationale Pour 
Participation Inustrielles et Commericialeds, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 
197(1958) 
While the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme 
Court were dealing with cases of dismissal, the Utah Supreme Court 
made it clear that they were concerned with the petitioner being 
"denied to a hearing on the merits of the case." Kilpatrick at 966. 
While it is clear that a dismissal and an exclusion of necessary 
witnesses are in fact different on paper, the results are the same. 
Kilpatrick not only addresses dismissals but stands for the larger 
proposition of due process ensured by the U.S. Constitution. 
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A hypothetical extension ofKilpatrick serves to illuminate this 
point. The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Under 
instructions that a dismissal, based upon a discovery violation, was 
inappropriate because it violated due process, how well received 
would a discovery sanction short of dismissal but tantamount to a 
dismissal be received? Is this kind of semantic change acceptable? 
The trial court could just merely exclude any evidence of Mr. 
Kilpatrick's illness from trial, because no autopsy was performed and 
the same result would be achieved. Such a ruling would not be a 
dismissal but would be form over substance. This would allow trial 
courts to carefully package a ruling to skirt legitimate due process 
issues and claim that it was a lack of evidence that lost the case and 
not a dismissal. Due process should be protected regardless of how 
the violations are termed. 
In the present case, no bodies were burned. No permanent 
damage was done to any evidence, as it was in Kilpatrick. Yet, the 
undisputed evidence presented in the motions by Lippman that he was 
unable to find a witness in time (inability according to the Supreme 
Court) were summarily cast aside or ignored by the trial court and 
called tale tales by Coldwell Banker. 
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Even if this Court does not want to folly adopt the stringent 
requirements of due process set forth in Kipatrick, the consideration 
or lack thereof by the trial court of the exigent circumstances and 
justification falls far short of any standard this Court has adopted or 
may adopt and will be addressed later. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
EXCLUDING LIPPMAN'S EXPERT WITNESSES. 
Rule 37(f) provides that by rule, a court must exclude evidence when 
the evidence is not timely disclosed unless there is no harm or there is good 
cause shown. Coldwell Banker wants to beat the war drum that the experts 
were not submitted in a timely fashion and therefore should be excluded. 
Coldwell also argues that there is no evidence to support the claims of 
exigency. Finally, Coldwell Banker gets to the point and argues there is 
prejudice and no good cause, but without any actual showing of prejudice or 
explanation why there is no good cause shown. 
A. TIMELINESS IS NOT CONCLUSIVE IN THIS MATTER 
NOR HAS COLDWELL BANKER SUFFICIENTLY 
BRIEFED THIS ARGUMENT. 
Coldwell Banker argues mat the motion was not timely filed; and, 
therefore should be excluded. While admittedly the third motion was far 
after the motion discovery deadline, the lateness is excusable, not outcome 
determinative in this case, and not properly briefed by Coldwell Banker. 
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The first motion filed by Lippman was done after last minute notice 
was given that one report would not be done and the other witness would not 
be offering his expertise. Lippman mailed his motion on April 1 at the 
expiration of the order, but it was not received until April 3, 2009. Given 
the late notice such timing was excusable and until now has not been argued 
otherwise. 
The third motion was understandably late, given the facts in this case. 
Of course Lippman missed the deadline. Perhaps thei motion should have 
been couched as a motion to reconsider or better yet a motion to allow the 
designation of expert witnesses. Either way, the third motion was only 
responsive to the denial of the first motion, to add additional fact for the trial 
court and deal with the issue of "staleness." There is no way the third 
motion could be filed before the deadline. 
It is interesting to note that in multiple cases fhe deadline was missed 
and the case was determined on the merits. Posner, is one such example. 
Posner missed the deadline for disclosing his witnesses and merely disclosed 
his expert two weeks late. Id at f 24. The trial court did not refuse to hear 
the case on the merits nor did this Court, but rather determined by factual 
analysis that there was no justification and prejudice had resulted. 
Coldwell admits that they did not oppose the first motion when it was 
filed and only objected to the date requested in the motion as stale. To now 
go back and reverse course is duplicitous. Given that this Court in Posner 
and the Utah Supreme Court in Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) 
(overturned on other grounds) entertained the merits of those case for late 
disclosure without a "timely motion9' let alone a motion, speaks of the need 
to address this case on the merits rather than trying create technicalities 
without citing an legal authority for such an argument. This case should be 
heard regardless of whether motions were even filed. 
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 
P.2d 305, 313, "[i]t is well established that an appellate court will decline to 
consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief." This 
includes "no reference to legal authority in support of [their] contention." 
Coldwell Banker offers no legal authority or analysis for why this Court 
should deny Lippman his day before this Court due to filing dates. 
B. THE RECORD DOES HAVE EVIDENCE OF THE 
PROBLEMS THAT LIPPMAN HAD IN FINDING AN 
EXPERT. 
Coldwell Banker, once again without any citation to authority, 
suggests that Lippman was required to provide a letter, affidavit, or some 
other type of competent evidence to support the claims that they were 
9 
struggling to line up expert witnesses. Coldwell even goes as far as to claim 
they are "tall tales." 
Coldwell Banker never asked for a hearing or challenged the validity 
of the statements of counsel in these motions. Further, Coldwell Banker 
never explains why, in essence, those motions should be treated as motions 
for summary judgment requiring affidavits and evidence to support the 
proffers of counsel. 
Coldwell Banker should not be allowed to come before this Court and 
for the first time assert more proof is needed without any rules requiring 
such. Coldwell Banker or the Court could have requested or required a 
hearing to allow counsel to come forward and proffer, or to provide letters or 
documentation in detail as to the efforts made to find experts and the last 
minute problems. Until now, neither the trial court nor counsel has asked for 
such. Instead, Coldwell Banker, for all intents and purposes, calls Lippman 
and his counsel liars and asks this court to ignore the undisputed proffers 
presented in the motions and a part of the record for this Court. 
Finally, like the last argument, Coldwell Banker provides no law or 
meaningful analysis just accusations. Under Valcarce, this argument should 
be declined. 
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C. THE LATE DESIGNATION IS NOT HARMFUL TO 
COLDWELL AND IT IS JUSTIFIED. 
Coldwell finally addresses the merits of this case by arguing there is 
no good cause shown and that Coldwell has been prejudiced. Pursuant to 
Rule 37(f) and the applicable case law, if there is no harm or there is good 
cause shown, the trial court must exercise its discretion before excluding the 
evidence. Further, given the gravity of the results, care must be taken not to 
violate due process as earlier explained. 
Neither the trial court in its ruling nor Coldwell Banker in its 
opposition to the designation of the expert witnesses have given any 
meaningful reasons why Coldwell Banker has been harmed other than 
general statements about delay in the trial and the costs to Coldwell Banker. 
As to the delays in the case, this defies logic. Coldwell Banker comes 
in with unclean hands. As pointed out in the Appellants initial brief, 
Coldwell Banker had sat virtually idle for months in this case while 
Lippman vigorously pursued judgment against other parties and searched for 
an expert witness. After months of doing little or nothing, Coldwell Banker 
responds to the motion at hand by filing a memorandum in opposition and 
filing a request for a final pretrial conference. One must really wonder if 
Lippman had not designated his witnesses and asked the trial court to allow 
them, whether Coldwell Banker would still be doing next to nothing and 
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waiting as so many parties do in a defensive posture. Coldwell Banker 
wants to call Lippman disingenuous and full of false pretense, but at the 
same time can offer no explanation as to why they asked for a final pretrial 
when Lippman asked to disclose his witnesses as opposed to months before. 
The trial court on the other hand, whether intentional or not, sat on the 
submitted motion in question here for two months, set a trial date, and then 
stated as a fundamental reason for denying the motion that a trial date had 
already been set. The trial date was set mere days before the decision was 
rendered and two months after the motion was submitted to the Court. All 
Lippman asked for was to disclose his witnesses and to give the other side 
some time to depose the witnesses if they chose. Such a limited request 
could have been granted and completed within those two months the court 
sat on both this motion and the pretrial request. No delays can be claimed. 
Even if there were to be minimal delays, there is no explanation as to how 
insignificant delays would prejudice Coldwell Banker's presentation of their 
case. 
The only other prejudice claimed is one of financial costs. The trial 
court offers no explanation at all and Coldwell Banker offers very little. 
Coldwell Banker asserts that they have made trial preparations based 
upon Lippman having no expert witnesses. Yet, Coldwell Banker was well 
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aware that Lippman intended to have experts as Lippman5 s first motion at 
the discovery deadline back in April of 2008 apprised Coldwell of 
Lippman5 s intentions nearly a year before Coldwell Banker filed a pretrial 
request. Coldwell Banker has shown that no additional expenses would 
have been incurred with a late disclosure. 
This notion that it is cheaper to try the case without experts on one 
side is true but defies logic when applied to Rule 37(f). Any evidence under 
Rule 37(f) would be either prejudicial because it helps the side submitting 
the evidence and thus requires more work to defend it from the other side or 
it is irrelevant and not admissible anyway. With such a broad expansive 
interpretation of harm, as proposed by Coldwell Banker, this would render 
the harm portion of Rule 37(f) meaningless as it would apply to all cases. 
Somewhere a more detailed and explanation of harm should be given. 
Even if this Court finds harm, good cause has been shown and 
undisputed. In the first motion for more time, Lippman was very specific in 
detailing to the Court who his experts were and why he needed more time 
and another expert. In the last motion, which is before this Court, Lippman 
not only expressed again why he needed an expert, but gave a brief but 
detailed explanation of the tremendous efforts that Lippman and his counsel 
went through to find a new expert and get his report ready to submit. 
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The trial court shrugs of the difficulty of finding an expert and 
Coldwell Banker scoffs at the idea and calls Lippman a liar. The reality is 
that Coldwell Banker chose experts from within house and has no idea how 
difficult it can be to find one expert commercial real estate agent let alone 
replace him when he chooses not to testify, when a party doesn't have in 
house experts at their beck and call. 
Ultimately, the facts before this Court are that Lippman lost an expert 
witness and made tremendous and often fruitless efforts to replace that 
witness. Such a factually unopposed fact pattern is not only good cause but 
constitutes "inability" as espoused by the United States Supreme Court and 
echoed by the Utah Supreme Court. Kilpatrick at 966. 
Finally, Coldwell Banker spends some time saying that the trial 
court's decision to punish Lippman for what happened to Deem is one of the 
factors the trial court considered. This is somewhat of a red herring. It is 
clearly something the trial court considered. Lippman's contention as 
already stated in his original brief is to indicate that such a factor and lack of 
other considerations showed an disturbing look by the trial court in the 
wrong direction. 
Yes, the trial court had previously amended the scheduling order to 
compensate for withdrawal of counsel, but not for Lippman. Yes, Lippman 
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amended his pleadings to get the right Coldwell Banker because counsel for 
Salkin and later Coldwell Banker left it to Lippman to find the right broker. 
Lippman had to amend the pleadings to get the right broker. 
In fact, as pointed out in the initial brief, the docket is full of 
consistent and meaningful effort by Lippman to prosecute this case. 
Ultimately, the real problem Lippman has with the order is the trial 
court completely ignored Lippman's argument. As pointed out in the initial 
brief, it is evident that the trial court completely overlooked the exigent 
circumstances in a rush to deny Lippman5 s expert witnesses. 
Finally, the decision in Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71 speaks volumes. 
In Boice, an expert witness withdrew shortly before trial and the other party 
complained of prejudice because there would not be sufficient time to 
depose the witness before the trial. The trial court denied the expert witness. 
The Utah Supreme Court in reversing that order spoke with a clarion call. 
The court stated: 
even if it were true that Marble could take the deposition of 
three witnesses before trial but not the new expert, the trial 
court could have obviated any prejudice granting a motion for a 
continuance. Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
allows a court to postpone a trial 'upon good cause shown...5 
Given the unexpected nature of Newton's withdrawal, and 
considering all the other surrounding circumstances, we 
determine the trial court abused its discretion in excluding 
Boice's substitute expert witness 
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Boiceat^Ill. 
This case screams out, like Boice, we lost an expert and need to tind a 
new one. This was pointed out long before a trial date was set. The Court 
sat on the submitted motion for two months and then set a trial date anyway. 
This case screams, like Boice, we have exigent circumstances and good 
cause shown. The trial court should have never ignored Lippman's plight. 
The trial court did not even need to grant a continuance of trial, as one was 
not even set. All the trial court had to do was read Lippman's motion 
recognize the good cause shown and deny Coldwell Banker's attempt to 
hurry and get this case set for trial. 
When good cause is shown, trial courts must follow the guidance of 
Boice, and in the interest of justice and due process should make every effort 
to accommodate the party in need and were necessary obviate any prejudice. 
This is the problem that Lippman has with the trial court's order and 
Coldwell Banker's attempt to create its own prejudice and cram a trial date 
down Lippman's throat. 
III. LIPPMAN DID PROPERLY MARSHALL SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FACTUAL FINDING. 
Coldwell Banker relies on various cases to argue that Lippman has the 
burden of marshalling the evidence that the trial court's factual finding is 
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incorrect. However, such a simplistic statement is overreaching in its 
meaning. First, the context of the cases is dealing with a presentation of 
evidence were facts are in dispute and the trial court has to weigh credibility. 
Second, what Lippman must is trying to show in disputing the ruling by the 
trial is right in the record and has been pointed to this Court in Lippman's 
initial brief. 
The cases relied upon by Coldwell Banker assess the role of this Court 
when conflicting facts are presented to the trial court. A trial court's job is 
to "assess the credibility and to assign weight to conflicting evidence." 
Burton Lumber and Hardware Company v. Graham, 186 P.3d 1012, 1017 
(UT App 2008). "The trial court is in the best position to weigh conflicting 
testimony, and assess credibility, and from this make a finding of facts." 
Fisher v.Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1178 (UT App 1995). 
It is axiomatic that a trial court sits with the best of advantage to see 
the presentation of evidence, to weigh the credibility of witnesses, and to try 
and find the truth among the varying stories. 
In this case, there really are not facts, in the usual sense to marshal. 
Most of decision by the trial court states basic facts that are not contested, 
and the then berates Lippman for not a J read \ having an expert. A brief 
glance and the memoranda show otherwise. There is no dispute of fact or 
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judgment of credibility between witnesses here. The trial court either 
ignored Lippman's argument or implicitly called him a liar with no 
explanation of his or his counsels' credibility. 
The trial court claims a trial date was set before this motion was 
decided. While this is true, the trial court conveniently ignores that this 
motion was submitted two months before the trial court set a court date 
based upon a pretrial request submitted with the memorandum in oppositioi 1 
to Lippman's motion. Technically, this is true. Intellectually, it is 
completely dishonest. 
These are just two examples of the myriad of problems with the trial 
court's order that have already been addressed in the initial brief. Such 
anomalies supported by the record and such lack of consideration of 
proffered facts are what is being questioned. 
There was no trial. The record is clear. The trial court has no better 
vantage point than this Court does as all suppositions as to what the facts are 
come from pleadings and the docket. This Court can readily assess the 
concerns as pointed out by Lippman without any deference to the trial 
court's judgment of conflicts of evidence and credibility as the dispute does 
not involve such allegations. 
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CONCLUSION 
In Boice, a case very similar to this one, the court stated: 
[o]n occasion justice and fairness will require that a court allow 
a party to designate witnesses, conduct discovery, or otherwise 
perform tasks covered by a scheduling order after the court-
imposed deadline for doing so has expired. We believe this 
case presents such a circumstance. 
Id at 110. 
Lippman believes such is the case again. The trial coui t igi lored the 
good cause shown and the exigency in this case, when the facts are very 
similar to those in Boice. Further, the trial court claimed prejudice without 
substantiating this claim with any clarity. The trial court abused its 
discretion in excluding the disclosure of Lippman5 s experts and precluding 
his right to a fair trial. 
DATED aiid SIGNED this U day of January, 2010 
LEBARON & JENSEN, P.C. 
Bri^Tl^5Sncan 
Attorney for Appellant 
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